Locke hammered this point home throughout the book. We have no innate knowledge of theoretical or practical principles (Book I. i-iv). Our words are largely Ôdoubtful and uncertain in their signification,Õ which impairs communication and the representation of states of affairs . Where the acquisition of empirical knowledge is concerned, we are confined to Ôa small part of the immense Universe,Õ and as to the other planets Ôwhat sorts of Furniture and Inhabitants those Mansions contain in them, we cannot so much as guess (IV. iii. 24). Here on earth, we are limited to the perception of middle-sized objects; we can't see the subvisible corpuscles upon which everything depends (IV.iii. 25). Even if we could see them, we wouldnÕt be able to understand how configurations of primary qualities give rise to secondary and tertiary qualities (IV.iii. 25-6).
the strict rules of his duty; he need but look abroad into any stage of the world, to be convinced...Õ (R 112).
Had Locke been a more conventional philosopher, human mediocrity would not have presented him with the problem of reconciling anthropology with moral demandingness; he could have subscribed to the traditional scheme of fallen-man-but-with-God-given-free-will that had long served to reconcile inherent sinfulness with moral obligation. But Locke did not really believe in free will. On the contrary, he thought that human beings are essentially passional, hedonistic organised bodies. Our constitutions, in all their reactivity and impulsiveness, are given to us by God for our own benefit, but God at the same time requires from us behaviour in conformity with Christian moral principles.
Doubting the existence of an incorporeal soul and regarding the person as a material machine endowed with a bundle of powers, Locke decided to try, as he explained in his Epistle to the Reader of the Essay, the difficult task: Ôto put Morality and Mechanism togetherÕ (I. iii. 14). He had to show why libertinism was not the inevitable consequence of accepting mortalism and materialism. He had three distinct solutions to this problem, which also required him to present a new theory of the Resurrection as personality-restoration via memory-restoration. The first solution involved undercutting his own passional account by assigning the mind a power of suspension. A second, more satisfactory and interesting solution was to treat moral competence on analogy with physical skill, as a capability achieved through instruction and practice. The third solution was to face the mediocrity problem head on and to insist on divine forgiveness.
In the final analysis, Locke didnÕt paint a very convincing picture of moral responsibility. For, despite Ðindeed, because of--his suspicion that we are hedonistic machines, he needed the Christian revelation with its carrot-and-stick approach to defining and cultivating rectitude.
2 This commitment sat oddly, to the contemporary mind, with his metaphysically cautious and sociologically observant outlook. Nevertheless LockeÕs project of relating morality to nature and education as far as possible is impressive, and the more radical elements of his moral psychology, though they were evident to 18th century empiricists, have perhaps not been appreciated fully. Locke describes multiple instances of passional behaviour, striving for a descriptively adequate, realistic account of human cravings, ambivalence, and weakness. He was a mechanical philosopher who denied the will an autonomous role and who refused to assert that the faculty of reason is sovereign over feeling.
To explore the limits theme in LockeÕs moral philosophy and to argue for this interpretation of the morality-and-mechanism passage, I will first defend the claim that humans, in LockeÕs view are soulless corporeal machines (or at least that moral theory must assume that they are). Next, I draw attention to some of LockeÕs many passages on emotionality and impulsivity; and finally I comment on the forgiveness theme in his moral theology, a conceptual device that to some extent mediates between his naturalism and his moralism.
I. LockeÕs theory of the material soul
One of the many background assumptions Locke was challenging in the Essay was that an incorporeal, intrinsically immortal soul endowed with a free will was a necessary condition of morally significant agency. He did not think our practices should rely on an experience-transcendent proposition, and, on his considered view, ÔAll the great Ends of Morality and Religion, are well enough secured, without philosophical Proofs of the Soul's ImmaterialityÕ (IV. iii. 6).
There is room for debate on the question what Locke had in mind with his counterproposal that God might have superadded powers of thought to matter Ôsuitably organised.Õ There is further room for debate over whether he believed that that is what happened, and that we are wholly material and mortal beings, or held, more cautiously and circumspectly, that the existence of the separable Cartesian soul was an unproved though possible, indeed probable hypothesis. 3 Although his language sometimes indicates the latterÑLocke declares that it not his intention anywhere to Ôin any way lessen the belief of the Soul's ImmaterialityÕ (IV.iii.6 )--and although there was apparently nothing to be gained by way of public esteem and much to be lost in advancing the former thesis, consideration of the Essay as a whole suggests that Locke, in company with many physicians of the 17th century, suspected the former to be true.
The attack on the Cartesian soul and the corresponding defense of thinking matter is developed by employing the mediocrity argument. According to Locke, ÔThe simple ideas we receive from sensation and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts; beyond which the mind, whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot; nor can it make any discoveries, when it would pry into the nature and hidden causes of those ideasÕ (II. xxiii. 29).
We have an idea of the soul derived through experience as an immaterial thing that thinks and that can Ôexcite motion in the body by willing or thoughtÕ (but not bodies at a distance from it) , and an idea of body derived through experience as involving Ôthe cohesion of solid, and consequently separable parts, and a power of communicating motion by impulseÕ(II. xxii.17). Both ideas are ÔobscureÕ. The idea of matter is obscure because cohesion is inexplicable, and so is the communication of motion. The idea of the soul is obscure because we can have no experience of things that do not impact on our senses. So, as far as proper epistemology, that is ÔContemplation of our own Ideas, without revelation,Õ is concerned, we cannot discover either that ÔOmnipotency has given to Matter fitly disposed, a power to perceive and thinkÕ or that God has Ôjoined and fixed to Matter so disposed, a thinking immaterial SubstanceÕ (IV. iii.6).
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In his lengthy correspondence with Stillingfleet over what was obviously a provocative remark, Locke refused to back down. He developed an argument that is not found in the Essay, though it is consistent with his view that nature is characterised by continuity and with his appeal to gravity as a superaddition.Õ 5 First, he argued that even in purely material systems such as the solar system, the Ôbare essenceÕ or Ônatural powersÕ of matter are unable to account for planetary orbits. Next, he pointed out that Ôthe vegetable part of the creation is not doubted to be wholly material; and yet he that will look into it, will observe excellencies and operations in this part of matter, which he will not find contained in the essence of matter in general, nor be able to conceive how they can be produced by it.Õ Advancing to the animal world, we Ômeet with yet greater perfections and properties, no ways explicable by the essence of matter in general.Õ This indicates that the Creator superadded the ÔqualitiesÕ of life, sense, and spontaneous motion, along with a power of propagation, and so, the implication is, the addition of the property of thought is only the next step in Ôthe superinducement of greater perfections and nobler qualitiesÕ.
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As well as professing ignorance as to the nature of substance, and as to GodÕs employment of His powers, and advancing the stepwise argument just cited, Locke engages in constant sniping at the incorporeal Cartesian soul that is the repository of imprinted innate ideas and whose essence it is to think. Their claim that the essence of the soul is to think forced the Cartesians to embrace the conclusion that the soul always thinks (on pain of the selfÕs not existing), in the womb, when asleep, when detached from the body (II. i. he appears to take seriously the idea that souls can be detached from bodies in which they are or were ordinarily resident and attached to other bodies.
To the first point, all Locke appears to mean here is that neither matter nor thought could have come into the world in the absence of an original thinking being with creative powers. The Ôreal beingÕ of the soul does not imply the reality of individual incorporeal cogitative substance, by contrast with the real existence of soul-functions. All we know is that
Ôwe have in us something that thinksÕ (IV. Ii. 6)--a Ôspiritual beingÕÑnot what its metaphysical nature is, and we can safely take the reference to the Ôimmaterial thinking beingÕ that is a condition of anythingÕs seeing and hearing to be the Creator. To the second point, when Locke refers to the existence of the incorporeal soul as the more ÔprobableÕ opinion, I take it he is using ÔprobableÕ in the casuistic sense; it is the opinion accepted by most authorities. He cannot be using ÔprobableÕ in an evidentiary sense, insofar as he 
II. LockeÕs Depiction of Passional Man
We are, then, corporeal machines with superadded qualities and powers, including life, movement, reproduction, experience and thinking, and we find ourselves in the world endowed with a set of reactions and mental habits that preserve our lives. Pain and pleasure, punishment and reward, are the basic elements of the human experiential economy. 10 ÔGod has so framed the constitutions of our minds and bodies,Õ says Locke in his early essay on the passions 11 Ôthat several things are apt to produce in both of them pleasure and pain, delight and trouble, by ways that we know not, but for ends suitable to His goodness and wisdom.
Thus the smell of roses and the tasting of wine, light and liberty, the possession of power and the acquisition of knowledge please most men, and there are some things whose very being and existence delights others, as children and grandchildren.Õ
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The references to pleasure--to sensory pleasure and the pleasures of human relationshipsÑestablishes Locke as something of a voluptuary, refusing both Christian aceticism and Stoic ideals of independence and tranquillity. Here he follows Descartes, who insisted that perceptions, feelings, and emotions are all essentially good, and Hobbes who considered tranquillity a false and absurd ideal. Like the ÔideasÕ of the external world generated by the senses, and the ÔideasÕ of hunger and thirst generated by the bodily organs, feelings and emotions are ÔideasÕ produced by situations. According to DescartesÕs influential account, pleasure and pain and their prospects prompt actions, according to the designs of God, for the welfare of the living creature. Although the senses and our internal sensations can deceive us, they mostly do not, and we do well for the most part to trust them. 13 The same holds for the emotions. For Hobbes, tranquillity belongs neither to death nor to life, for it is a denial of the Ôvital motionsÕ by which we live. 14 For both of LocvkeÕs predecessors, the passions sometimes need repression, not because tranquillity is a desirable state of the soul but rather because they can be dangerous or harmful to other people. For
Locke, as for Hobbes and Spinoza, emotion-driven religious and political enthusiasms and the persecution manias of groups become the focus of concern. what they would (continuously) prefer to do, absent the blocking feature. Lacking liberty is in fact a fairly common occurrence. In the morning, the drunkard prefers not to waste his estates and he is is free to resist a drink, but as evening comes, the drinking motivation swamps that preference and he cannot do otherwise than go down to the soaking club.
Locke refers in this connection to those Ôextreme disturbancesÕ that can Ôpossesses our whole mind. ÔSome ideas,Õ he says, like some motions to the body, are such as in certain circumstances it cannot avoid, nor obtain their absence by the utmost effort it can use. A man on the rack is not at liberty to lay by the idea of pain, and divert himself with other contemplations: And sometimes a boisterous passion hurries our thoughts as a hurricane does our bodies, without leaving us the liberty of thinking on other things, which we would rather chooseÕ (II:xxi:12).
...
[A] ny vehement pain of the body, the ungovernable passion of a man violently in love, or the impatient desire of revenge, keeps the will steady and intent; and the will, thus determined, never lets the understanding lay by the object, but all the thoughts of the mind and powers of the body are uninterruptedly employed that way, by the determination of the will, influenced by that topping uneasiness as long as it lasts (II:xxi:38).
For a woman who has lost a beloved child, its death Ôrends from her Heart, the whole comfort of her Life, and gives her all the torment imaginable; use the Consolations of Reason in this case, and you were as good preach Ease to one on the Rack, and hope to allay by Rational Discourses, the Pain of his Joints tearing asunderÕ (II:xxxiii.13). The idea of the child and her lost enjoyment are so tightly associated that if time does not erode her memories she may
Ôcarry an incurable SorrowÕ to the grave.
Thus reason has no definite power over the emotions. The powers of self-control we associate with the will come and go; when, experientially, we regain control of ourselves in a moment of fury, or are able to resist some temptation, we feel and describe ourselves as Ôfree.Õ But freedom is not a metaphysical attribute that we possess in virtue of having a soul.
Contrary to what Descartes said, it is not in the least comparable with GodÕs will. ÔWillingÕ implies desiring and preferring, and emotion-driven behaviour is not what takes over when reason loses its grip but the only real option. Consequently, moral motivation can only take the form of appetite; it is on all fours with hunger and thirst ÔÕLet a man be never so well perswaded of the advantages of virtueÉyet till he hungers and thirsts after righteousness, till he feels an uneasiness in the want of it, his will will not be determinÕd to any action in pursuit of this confessed greater goodÕ (II. xxi. 35).
Having analysed human freedom in terms of preferences and obstacles, and voiced the view that human beings are neither free nor determined but sometimes able to direct their thoughts and actions, at other times utterly undone and overwhelmed by them, Locke, in the first edition of the Essay, declared that ÔGood, therefore, the greater good, is that alone which determines the will.Õ It is widely believed that he changed his mind in response to criticism, but close analysis shows that he changed only his wording, which was misleading, but not his underlying view. 16 His original argument in First Edition of the Essay, II. xxi.28-45, ran as follows Pleasure and pain, whether of mind and body, are produced by the operation of bodies on us.
Happiness is pleasure, Misery is pain.
Whatever produces or contributes to Happiness is what we call Good.
Whatever produces or is conducive to Misery we call Evil.
The will is determined by what best pleases it.
ÔGood, therefore, the greater good, is that alone which determines the will.Õ If we were able to look on happiness (pleasure) and our misery (pain) with indifference, he comments, we would not be free but miserable and enslaved. Someone who does not respond to hedonic incentives and ahedonic disincentives, in other words, must be in the grip of some pathology. But if the Good is, ultimately, pleasure, isnÕt this to say that our liberty is not diminished in having no freedom to be indifferent to pleasure? How is this view tenable?.
LockeÕs original answer to this question was that ÔgoodÕ and ÔevilÕ do just reflect preferences; every evil is somebodyÕs good and vice versa. Some people are attracted by study and knowledge, some by hawking and hunting; some go in for by luxury and debauchery, others for sobriety and riches. Some people prefer wine to the preservation of their eyesight. In the second edition of the Essay, where the chapter on Powers was greatly expanded, Locke apologised to his readers for his apparent error in agreeing with the received view that the will always pursues, is always determined by, the greater Good (II. The constant references to legs and limbs in the Conduct speak only to the parallelism, not to the identity of mind and body. They do however invite the reader to regard human rationality in a robustly physical light. Moral education meanwhile serves to replace destructive or useless forms of uneasiness with more constructive ones. It aims at creating an appetite for the long term good and to make the pupil or oneself Ôuneasy in the want of it, or in the fear of losing itÉÕ (II. Xxi. 53). Religious instruction, Locke thought, including instruction in the Christian duties and their rewards and penalties serves as input to the human machine that can modify the character of young persons. Even the Stoic philosophy found in Cicero can have this beneficial effect.
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At times, these remodelling efforts seem to be carried too far in LockeÕs imagination.
He thought not only that children could be conditioned out of their baseless fears, such as fear of frogs, by a kind of cognitive behavioural therapy, but that they needed to be hardened This evident harshness and insistence on training in ÔstiflingÕ seems to contrast with the more sympathetic attitudes towards tears and neediness that Locke evinces in the Essay. This is consistent with his view that children are highly plastic, whereas adults are comparatively rigid. Once the critical age is past, the machine, with all its skills and associative habits is fully formed, and change is difficult. Recognising the power of desires in adult life, Locke clearly thinks it best to begin early in learning self-control. His apparent severity on the subject of childrenÕs desires and vulnerabilities is consistent with his overall picture: human appetitiveness shows up already in childhood. The conflict between the demands of morality and the God-given constitution of human emotional and appetitive machinery is accordingly mitigated by the susceptibility of the machinery to teaching.
IV. Mediocrity and Forgiveness
The comparative rigidity of the adult mind leaves a residual problem of moral accountability. What about persons who have not received a Christian education, such as the infanticidal and cannibalistic Caribbeans described with evident horror in Book I, or those whose fully-formed emotional dispositions or cravings leave them vulnerable to rages and regrettable actions? Human emotionality and its sequelae can obtain divine forgiveness in LockeÕs theology. As our frame and constitution, and so the mechanisms that determine the human will, are established by the Creator, it would be morally and rationally unacceptable to be punished for every disobedient action or omission to which we are impelled. In his treatment of such persons, Locke reflects the softer theological mood of his contemporaries, the liberal Puritans and Anglicans, including Richard Baxter, Gilbert Burnet, and Isaac
Barrow who see divine knowledge and power as manifest in the understanding and mercy of God rather than in GodÕs piercing vision when it comes to the detection of hidden sins and the force and scope of his wrath.
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In The Reasonableness of Christianity, Locke makes this point clearly. The person whose rational self-control has forsaken them under intolerable pressure will receive divine mercy.
But if any extreme disturbance (as sometimes it happens) possesses our whole mind, as when the pain of the rack, an impetuous uneasiness, as of love, anger, or any other violent passion, running away with us, allows us not the liberty of thought, and we are not masters enough of our own minds to consider thoroughly and examine fairly; God, who knows our frailty, pities our weakness, and requires of us no more than we are able to do, and sees what was and what was not in our power, will judge as a kind and merciful father (II. Xxi. 53).
One cannot morally require, from a given human being, what their machine, by reason of its constitution and its experiences, cannot produce by way of prudent or correct behaviour.
There is no point in trying to reason with a woman who has lost a beloved child or with the drunkard or the person in a jealous rage. In such cases, while the law or society must punish the crimes that result, God, who sees into the heart, may forgive God, Locke says, Ôdid not expect... a perfect obedience, void of slips and falls: he knew our make, and the weakness of our constitution too well, and was sent with a supply for that defectÕ (R 112 Judging by his professed horror at the brutality of warfare and the practices of savages involving women and children, LockeÕs moral ideals relate to the protection of the weak, a value he finds exclusively in Christian religious teaching. The implicit distinction between the morally desirable and the merely desired requires a transcendental source in GodÕs commands, although the motive to obey them can only be a strictly prudential desire for eternal happiness over eternal misery. In the absence of GodÕs ability to reward and punish obedience and disobedience, and his commitment to doing so, all human motivation would be properly governed by a combination of appetite and mundane prudence.
Locke thought his argument for an incorporeal Creator of matter and the many and 
